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Abstract
The objective of this study is to analyse the management of political power and 
its consequences in sub-Saharan Africa. To achieve this, we have been interested 
in two countries of the subregion, Burkina Faso and Mali, because of demonstra-
tions, repressions and crises linked to elections. The study also concerns the 
Odjukru society, because it has a democratic political system. Both qualitative and 
quantitative works present the results of the field. It explains the democratic deficit 
through corruption, despotism, arbitrary arrests, etc. The study also analyses the 
consequences of poor governance (health and agro-economic problems). It finally 
describes a traditional Odjukru institution, Ɛb-eb, and shows how it can help in the 
rooting of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa.
Keywords: power management, democratic deficit,  
traditional democratic institution (Ɛb-eb), consequence, sub-Saharan Africa
1. Introduction
This article deals with the management of power and its consequences in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The matter of the administration of the city in Africa is a 
thorny problem that concerns many actors.1 In the aftermath of independence, 
the people of sub-Saharan Africa, fresh out of the colonial yoke, showed their joy. 
Unfortunately this enthusiasm turned into a nightmare, as some leaders chose to 
perpetuate themselves in power bypassing democratic rules. Also, the repression 
and the gerrymandering of the constitutions have become a mode of management, 
thus causing socio-political crises. To this situation, the coups of states, the rigging 
of elections, tribalism and other ills that plague African societies have been added. 
On this issue, Igue [1] shows that African countries with enlightened leadership 
have undergone advanced development, while those who are immersed in obscu-
rantism languish in poverty and victims of poor management of the city. Lopes [2] 
portrays the situation of discomfort experienced by the people, through the mythi-
cal history of a veteran, who made war in Algeria in the year 1960. Returning to the 
country, he went into rebellion and took part in a coup organized by young officers. 
He was appointed Minister of Defence and had great ambitions in this post, when 
he was suddenly sent as ambassador to Algeria by a ministerial reshuffle.
1 NGO, Researchers.
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Mali and Burkina Faso, which live at the pace of independent (modern) countries, 
are facing the same situation, which is not the case for traditional societies, including 
Lodjukru. These communities are of interest to the study for several reasons:
• The existence of a democratic deficit. In fact, repeated crises, conflicts, ethnic 
wars, confiscation of power, arbitrary imprisonment, corruption, health and 
agro-economic problems indicate that democracy is heavily rooted in sub-
Saharan Africa particularly in those countries.
• Ɛb-eb, an instrument of good governance. In the Lodjukru, power is passed 
down from generation to generation without competition and without vio-
lence, in a peaceful way, which justifies the stability of the city. The Ɛb-eb, a 
traditional democratic institution, appears as a blueprint for a solution to poor 
governance in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. From these observations 
follows a series of questions from a series of questions, the main one being 
“How can Ɛb-eb, a traditional Odjukru institution, address the democratic 
deficit, which has caused adverse consequences in sub-Saharan Africa?”
To this research question, the following questions are related are related to 
secondary issues: “What are the determinants of the democratic deficit?” “What 
are the consequences for people?” “What strategy do Odjukru use to stabilize their 
cities?” The objective of this study is to explain the poor governance and the role 
of Ɛb-eb in democratic management in sub-Saharan Africa. The thesis supported 
is “The traditional institution Odjukru can contribute to good governance in the 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa”.
Burkina Faso,2 Mali3 and Lodjukru4 are our areas of investigation. The choice of 
these localities is linked to political instability (repeated coups, repressions of demon-
strations, etc.) on the one hand, and the existence of a traditional, saving democratic 
institution is unknown on the other hand. Respondents are selected according to the 
criteria including availability, knowledge of crises and their consequences. We have 
made a sensible choice, because we are talking about targeting the resource people 
who are able to educate us more. In total, 102 respondents, men and women, are 
concerned with the study. The documentary analysis, the semi-directive interview 
and the questionnaire were mobilized to collect the information. The deepening of 
the results necessitated dialectic and comparative methods to understand the persis-
tence of socio-political crises. The theory of resilience allows, through the traditional 
institution (Ɛb-eb), to circumvent the evil governance in sub-Saharan Africa.
2. The democratic deficit and its consequences in the study areas
2.1 The determinants of the democratic deficit
This part of the study identifies the factors related to poor governance. To 
achieve this, we approached the respondents in these terms: “Why do crises persist 
in your country?” “What are the disadvantages?” Here are some of the answers 
obtained:
2 Independent country since 5 August 1960 under the name of Upper Volta and renamed Burkina Faso in 
1984; Surface: 274 200 km²; Population: 19 512 533 inhabitants (en 2016); Capital Ouagadougou.
3 Independent country since 22 September 1960; Surface: 1 241 238 km²; Population: 14.5 million inhabit-
ants (en 2010); Capital: Bamako.
4 Lower Cote d’Ivoire ; Surface: 2260 km²; Population: 148874 inhabitants; Chief Place: Dabou.
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Before coming to power, politicians hold sycophancy words. But when they’re 
elected, they make it their own. The people so pampered do not represent anything 
to their eyes. When they have to leave, it is the refusal and we drag in power.5
Today, history gives reason to this Frenchman and it is a pity. Africa is really 
not ripe for democracy. People who consider themselves to be intellectuals and the 
future of the country behave like vulgar characters. And that is unfortunate. It’s 
power for power. Even if they are unpopular, they still cling.6
The question arises as to whether the politicians are in power for us or not. They 
look at themselves as earthenware dogs. They’re interested in their belly. We use the 
people as sheep of panurge. People are standing up against each other for petty inter-
ests; if not how to understand the socio-political crisis? While some are enriched, 
the housewife’s basket shrinks considerably.7 We do not talk about the force shots. 
The country is champion in this matter, all because politicians are obsessed by power 
for power. Violence thus becomes a means of accession to power. The consequences 
are dramatic. Everywhere, there are deaths, the wounded, the destruction of public 
buildings, the mass displacement of people, famine and other disasters. In addi-
tion, favouritism, corruption, poor governance and unemployment are common to 
African countries without exception.8 The analysis stems from two comments:
• The first component concerns the determinants of the democratic deficit. 
Through the written, oral and lived experiences, we distinguish the coups of 
states and the authoritarian drifts. The facts concur and confirm our asser-
tion. In Mali, the first coup d’etat was recorded in 1968. Becoming president, 
the power of Kamani has turned into a single authoritarian party. He had a 
constitution adopted by “referendum” in 1969 and tolerated only one party, 
his US-RDA. In order to prevent possible subversions, leaders have set up 
popular militias framed by the party, which unfortunately is gnawed, 3 years 
later by internal quarrels. The promises of departure have turned into illusions, 
because they have never been respected. Taking advantage of the deteriorating 
socio-political situation and economic difficulties, a coup d’état led by young 
officers of the Malian army overthrew Kamani on 19 November 1968 [3]. After 
their seizure of power, the putschists abolished the constitution and founded 
the Military Committee for National Liberation (CMLN), which became the 
supreme organ of the country. In the days following the putsch, Moussa Traoré, 
a strong new man, promised in a communiqué a democratic regime, individual 
freedoms, trade unions, multipartism and free elections [4]. Instead, it is 
authoritarianism, dictatorship during the 23 years of management of power 
without sharing the reign of terror. Moussa Traoré adopted a new constitution 
on 2 June 1974 by referendum with the Stalinist score of 99% of the votes. He 
imposes the passage to the Second Republic and endowed the country with 
a single party, a national assembly and a president elected by universal suf-
frage for 5 years, which was already all found. No contradiction was tolerated. 
Annoying political opponents were arrested and eliminated. Thus, after his 
arrest and detention in Kidal (northeast), Keïta died on 16 May 1977, at the 
age of 62 years, under dubious circumstances. Yarra Dhar suffered the same 
fate in 1973. On 16 March 1980, the general secretary of the UNEEM,9 Abdoul 
5 T.C, Teacher, 42 years old, Malian.
6 A.Y, State agent, 33 years old, Burkinabé.
7 D.L, Trading agent, 51 years old, Malian.
8 P.H, health worker, 40 years old, Burkinabé ; M.K, Teacher, 50 years old, Malian.
9 National Union of students of Mali.
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Karim Camara, better known as “Cabral”, was arrested. On 22 March 1991, 
during the demonstrations organized in his memory, the situation escalated. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Touré (ATT) overthrew Moussa Traoré [5], who 
became president in 2002, but was deposed in 2012 before the end of his term 
by Captain Amadou Haya Salah, “third coup of state” [6].
Burkina Faso, “the country of men with integrity”, was not spared. Indeed, on 
3 January 1966, 6 years after the independence of the country, Maurice Yaméogo, 
the first president of the Republic of Upper Volta, was overthrown by Abdoulaye 
Sangoulé Lamizana, who was in turn deposited on 25 November 1980 by Colonel 
Sayé Zerbo. On 7 November 1982, Doctor-Commander Jean Baptiste Ouedraogo 
overturned Sayé Zerbo and became the head of the state at the helm of the People’s 
Salvation Committee. Thomas Sankara laid down Jean Baptiste Ouedraogo on 4 
August 1983. On 15 October 1987, Thomas Sankara was overthrown by soldiers 
under the direction of Captain Blaise Compaoré, his brother-in-arms. He died 
in circumstances not yet elucidated. He fell, following a popular uprising on 31 
October 2014. On the night of September 16 to 17, 2015, Gilbert Diendéré took the 
lead of a coup of state and evicted the president of the transition Michel Kafando, 
before returning power, following the external pressures [7].
These data raise the issue of governance in African countries. Indeed, democracy 
borrowed from the West is being harmed, because the principles attached to it are 
trampled on by leaders. Of the Greek demos (people) and kratos (power, authority), 
democracy generally refers to the political regime whose principle is that of the 
government of the people by the people and for the people [8]. He is the only 
legitimate holder of sovereignty, absolute and perpetual power, which he delegates 
to representatives through elections, with a view to better management of the state. 
Democracy is based on fundamental principles, including individual freedom, 
which is a right of everyone, to act independently without arbitrary measures. 
In the context of the study, freedom of opinion is not always respected. Yet at the 
international level, it is associated with freedom of expression and is the subject of 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) [9]:
Every individual has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, which implies 
the right not to be concerned for his opinions and that of seeking, receiving and 
disseminating, without considerations of borders, information and ideas by any 
means of expression whatsoever.
The claims of the freedoms are confiscated, though protests are constantly 
banned and suppressed in blood, which reaches the spirit of democracy. If this 
fundamental right is flouted, the electoral challenges also confirm the democratic 
deficit in those countries. Inseparable from democracy, election became a demo-
cratic rite [10]. It is the subject of international recognition, as the right to take part 
in the public affairs’ branch of its country, either directly or through freely chosen 
representatives, is included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.10
In many countries such as Mali, voices are rising11 to denounce unsavoury 
practices aimed at the rigging of elections. Civil society and NGOs are inviting 
themselves into the debate in order to ensure transparency in the elections [11]. 
This situation raises the question of the credibility of the results in Africa.  
10 Article 21.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
11 The Observatory for elections and good governance, a Malian NGO that has developed an expertise in 
the electoral field and good democratic governance since 1996.
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In the aftermath of independence, in the single party, elections were everywhere 
supervised by the Ministry of the Interior, which had the possibility of filling the 
ballot boxes and thus manipulating the data. We therefore understand the Soviet or 
Stalinist scores proclaimed after the elections (99.98%) in countries of the sub-
region. The practices and strategies for confiscating power have not changed war 
today. More than 50 years after independence, the so-called independent electoral 
commissions having replaced the Ministry of the Interior are corrupt, which justi-
fies the challenges at each deadline. This practice violates one of the fundamental 
principles of the separation of powers enunciated by Montesquieu [12]: In order to 
be able not to abuse power, it is necessary that, by the disposition of things, power 
should stop power:
The electoral litigation yesterday revered, today electoral litigation yesterday 
revered, today is in trial. Indeed, instead of being a factor of appeasement of 
conflicts by an impartial settlement of electoral disputes, it offers the image of a 
field mined by corruption with an dependence on politics and jurisprudence on 
“eclipses”. This “indecent” environment has created a public disaffection with regard 
to electoral litigation. This explains, moreover, the involvement of the international 
community in the process whose processes in place to guarantee electoral credibility 
and peace roughly compete with the electoral litigation with mixed successes [13].
Since 2000, elections have been held in almost all African countries. The exis-
tence of formal electoral processes does not prevent certain family dynasties from 
persisting. In addition, many elections are fraught with violence, and election crises 
can sometimes be resolved only by unsatisfactory power-sharing agreements [14]. 
Excerpts from newspapers confirm the reservations concerning the credibility of 
the results of the electoral commissions.
Legislative annulment in Divo and Kouibly: The Constitutional Council and the 
CIS reject the fault [15]:
Ex-vice president of the CIS angry after his defeat: A major fraud team led by a 
trio of ministers has settled. I do not intend to fly [16].
24 h after the decisions of the Constitutional Council, a former vice-president of 
the CEI: it is an electoral scandal, of the ministers accused [17].
Babo [18] also questioned the need to hold presidential elections in Africa. For 
him, a question of the political model imposed by the West, too costly in money and 
in life, is necessary.
• The second remark concerns the impact of poor governance on the society.
2.2 The consequences of the democratic deficit
Numerous in the study areas, they are perceptible at the social and agro-
economic level. The respondent’s words are eloquent, because they summarize the 
dramatic situation caused by evil governance:
We don’t talk about the force shots. The country is champion in this matter, all 
because politicians are obsessed by power for power. Violence thus becomes a means 
of accession to power. The consequences are dramatic. The deaths, the wounded, 
the destruction of public buildings, the mass displacement of populations, the 
famine and the emergence of metabolic diseases (diabetes, vascular heart accident, 
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high blood pressure). In addition, favouritism, corruption, poor governance and 
unemployment are common to African countries without exception.12
The above data indicate the actual existence of discomfort situations. In Mali, 
Modibo Kéita died in detention under conditions never elucidated. Yoro Diakité13 
and Abdoul Karim Camara14 suffered the same fate. In Burkina Faso, Thomas 
Sankara15 disappeared tragically. On 30 October 2014, tens of thousands of demon-
strators descended into the suburbs of Ouagadougou [19].
The consequences of the democratic deficit are shared by several West African 
countries. This is the case with Côte d’ivoire. Indeed, the socio-political crisis of 19 
September 2002 to 11 April 2011, linked to the frantic quest for power, has made 
more than 3000 deaths, not to mention the destruction of public and private prop-
erty. Food, water, gas, deaths due to drug shortages and diseases such as typhoid and 
cholera are part of the disasters caused by the democratic deficit. Patients suffering 
from metabolic diseases (diabetes, stroke, hypertension) have seen their health 
worsen. Indeed, the complexity of the crisis, because of its political ramifications, 
has caused a situation of discomfort. An embargo by the European Union has suffo-
cated the country. The health system has been deprived of medicines indispensable 
to the care of the sick. In the face of this difficulty, saturated emergencies are over-
whelmed with patients. There are many families whose parents have relatives have 
succumbed to their illness due to lack of medication. These respondents confirm:
During the crisis that shook our country after the 2010 presidential election, we saw a 
lot of disappointing things. The Westerners have caused the death of several patients 
with diabetes, hypertension, cardiac accident for nothing. How can one be foolish, to 
the point of being insensitive to the suffering of innocent people? An embargo on drugs 
is never seen before. Sick people died because of poorly enlightened politicians.16
Peace is trampled underfoot leaving free field to hatred and interethnic conflicts 
fuelled by politicians guided by a single concern, power. The internal refugees and 
those who fled the violence to meet in Ghana, Guinea, Togo and Benin are counted 
by the thousands. The patients, victims of trauma, swarm in the health centres. 
Everyone for all, all for all, God for all or acting solidarity has given way to everyone 
for himself, God for all.
Rwanda had also suffered the agony of the democratic deficit [20]. The United 
Nations [21] estimates that about 800,000 people, mostly Tutsi, lost their lives during 
these 3 months. Those among the Hutus who showed solidarity with the Tutsis were 
killed as traitors to the Hutu cause. For a hundred of days, it was the fastest genocide 
in history and the largest in the number of deaths per day. The story of Chukwuemeka 
Odumegwu Ojukwu was confused with that of Nigeria. Leader of the rebellion, he was 
for two and a half years (30 May 1967–8 January 1970) the self-proclaimed president 
of the secessionist region (Biafra) at the cost of hundreds of thousands of deaths [22].
If the dead are of life is recorded throughout Africa, the manifest willingness of 
some leaders to change the constitution in order to perpetuate themselves in power 
or position and their children as heirs also justifies the democratic deficit and its 
consequences:
12 P.H, health worker, 40 years old, Burkinabé ; M.K, Teacher, 50 years old, Malian.
13 A collaborator of Moussa Traoré, he was arrested in 1971 and also died in detention in 1973 under mys-
terious conditions.
14 Secretary General of the UNEEM, tortured dies in prison in the same year.
15 President, Founding father of the term ‘Burkina Faso’, dies tragically, in conditions never elucidated.
16 G.K, Ivorian, Employed in a company.
7Management of Political Power and Consequences in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Solution Outline
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.85998
In Africa, however, it is generally difficult to admit that the Constitution, even a 
liberal one, guarantees democratic life. The rulers seem to be above the constitutions 
they despise, as they do of the peoples they govern. They seem to be accountable only 
to old metropolises and international institutions. The diagnosis of evil has already 
been made, but the causes have rarely been seriously sought [23].
The force shots negatively affected the agriculture and the economy of these 
countries. In Burkina Faso, as it was to be expected, the force shot perpetrated 
on 17 September 2015 by the National Council for Democracy (CND) had many 
economic repercussions due to the cessation of activities in 10 days. According to the 
Extraordinary Council of Ministers of 28 September 2015, the losses amount to more 
than 50 billion FCFA. As a result, the government must turn to the partners to fill 
this gap, in order to close the budget year and to face the new challenges engendered 
by the coup. The elections scheduled in October 2015 were no longer relevant. The 
government intends to step up security measures. The extension of the transition 
already seems in the line of fire. According to the government, the force shot led 
to adverse consequences. If there are losses in human lives and social injuries, the 
general strike of the workers has led to the paralysis of all activities at the economic 
level, for several days. The work stoppage caused a slowdown in production in 
the business sectors, particularly the secondary and tertiary sectors, with direct 
consequences of less than 0.3% growth on public finances. According to the figures 
provided by the Minister of Economy and Finance, in terms of taxes, the recovery 
losses incurred during the coup period were estimated at about 11 billion CFA francs. 
In terms of customs revenue, they are estimated at about CFAF 9.7 billion; in terms 
of cash, direct losses amount to CFAF 30.80 billion. If the losses are huge at the 
macro level, they are also huge at the micro level.
In Ouagadougou, for example, fishmongers and bakeries have seen their goods rot 
due to lack of customers. With the curfew which is fixed at 19 h, night workers (mar-
quis, restaurants, etc.) have recorded many losses. The traders of Rood-woko who are 
supplied with various products, thinking to do good business in the approach of the 
festival of the Tabaski, had to disillusion. Customers are without money; that is to say, 
the future is hard enough for Burkinabe. Depending largely on external aid, the state 
will still turn to the partners. In 2014, economic activity slowed down considerably, 
with GDP growth estimated at only 4% compared to more than 6% in previous years. 
The decline in economic activity was caused by the fall in international prices of the 
country’s two export commodities (gold and cotton); by the repercussions of the Ebola 
crisis in the region, which has disrupted the tourism sectors and services; and by the 
popular uprising of October 30 and 31. The sharp drop in tax revenues, combined with 
an increase in the wage bill, required a sharp reduction in public investment spending.
It has thus compromised the implementation of the government’s accelerated 
Strategy for Growth and Sustainable Development (SCADD). With this new blood 
loss of 50 billion, the economic equilibrium is questioned. It will be necessary to 
quickly find alternatives for economic recovery [24].
Mali is not spared. At the time of independence, the country was a net exporter 
of cereals. The 1970s, marked by a series of catastrophic droughts and a growing 
share of local needs, was filled with international food aid and imports. At the same 
time, the Office of Agricultural Products of Mali (OPAM) held the legal monopoly 
of grain marketing [25]. With the force shot on 19 November 1968, bringing Moussa 
Traoré to power, the first measures taken by the military government in economic 
matters were the dismantling of collective fields and the removal of monopoly 
OPAM. Indeed, this structure had accumulated huge deficits (20.4 billion CFA 
francs in 1981). It only bought less than 5% of local production. This situation 
explains the pressure of the main donors of food aid for a reform of the grain market. 
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Negotiations between the Malian government and the donors culminated in 1981 
with the establishment of the Program for Restructuring the Cereal Market (PRMC).
In 1980, a report by the World Bank drew up a fairly damning picture of the situ-
ation of the Malian economy. It considers that the structure of the Malian economy, 
with a state orientation, is characterized by a series of complex mechanisms of transfer. 
About 90% of the country’s budgetary resources guarantee employment for only a tiny 
fraction of the Malian workforce in a parastatal state sector. This relatively privileged 
part of the population benefits almost alone from an assured supply of consumer goods. 
Resources do not come only from the rural world but from all productive activities that 
are potentially more profitable. They are unable to borrow and invest. “In the end, all the 
internal mechanisms of the Malian economy function in the sense of a withdrawal of 
resources from the poor to the nonpoor and from productive to non-productive” [26].
Comparative analysis shows that Africa, particularly Saharan countries, suf-
fers from poor governance. As a result, one question comes back as a leitmotiv: 
“Is Africa ripe for democracy?” To this question concern, an anticipated response 
seems to be found. In the early 1990, Jacques Chirac stated: “Democracy is a luxury 
for Africa”. Insult or reality? On the question, part of the intelligentsia felt offended, 
infantilized, ridiculed and humiliated. Great was the emotion, what more normal. 
But the observation of daily life and political events in Africa has finally convinced 
us that democracy is modelled on the Western model. Indeed, did the French state17 
not mandate Pierre Mazeaud18 to write the constitutions of Chad, Togo and Niger? 
How many African countries are exempt? Despite their importance, they are dif-
ficult to swallow as pills administered to patients for the simple reason that they are 
inadequate. This is the justification of Kyelem’s thesis [23]:
Despite their beautiful mount, African constitutions are totally alien to the peoples 
of Africa. They are products of the Westernized elite, destined for its own contem-
plation and to reassure the international community of its fidelity in the mimicry. 
The Constitution in Africa is usually a legal varnish making up a personal or 
oligarchic power.
The daily experience of traditional societies shows that democracy is not in exile 
in Africa. Many anthropologists, including [27], have indicated the major role they 
can play in democratic advancement. The Odjukru sample is an illustration of this.
3. Ɛb-eb: a traditional institution serving democracy in Africa
This part of the study describes Ɛb-eb and explains its link with good governance. 
It is of Odjukru invention. In the village of Armɛbɛ, here are three cycles of Abrmâ, 
between 1800 and 1831, and three rich notables of the age-class Nigbesi decided to 
offer food and drink to the people in order to obtain their blessing on their reign. The 
initiative of the group would have become a custom and then an institution with the 
accreditation and organization introduced by the assembly of the age classes [28]. 
This tradition, which leaves unclear the names of the authors, the process of institu-
tionalization and the first modalities of diffusion, remains the first at least to attest to 
the endogeneity of a large sociocultural institution among Odjukru. The place of birth 
of the latter can be placed at the penultimate site of Armɛbɛ, near Aklodj-Ɛb-Sig-Ɛm, a 
rare village to be preserved, in the old form of the ritual. How is Ɛb-eb organized?
17 Event (french weekly journal) n°604, Thursday, may 30th, 1996.
18 President of National Assembly commissionof laws.
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It is every 8 years after the initiation of an age class that the ceremonies of the 
coronation take place. Opened after the initiation of the third subclass kata in 
the small rainy season, it follows from village to village, 2 years in a row, follow-
ing the same traditional order. The coronation obeyed several stages, including 
the offering of attieke. The first obligation of the candidates towards the village 
is the offering of food and drink. The offering of the political investiture varies 
in terms of distribution from one locality to another. It goes to the whole village, 
except the outgoing rulers, the nomination contestants and the uninitiated. It 
is after this common meal that the calendar of ceremonies is stopped. From the 
initiation announcing the season of the coronation, the candidates are called to 
remain in the village. Distant voyages are outlawed. After the offering of attieke, 
there will be more productive activity. The period of war already begins.
The second retreat is solemnly formalized on the consecrated day. The news is 
spreading in all the villages. The day before, from everywhere, the parents bring to 
the candidate the most splendid pieces of loincloths, adornments and ornaments 
of the family patrimony. Children, grandchildren and friends address food, drink, 
toiletries, an emulation of love, piety and generosity. A great Jaj19 formerly accom-
panied the retreat. Returning to the interior of the houses, with the fall of the night, 
the candidates will officially appear at the Agora only to undergo the investiture. 
Retirement lasts at least a week; every day, superb and varied toilets, good food 
and price drinks. In the various courses, songs and dance often commanded from 
distant villages; every night and every morning, big drum praising the village and 
exalting the great men. How do the candidates receive the coronation of the ruler?
The day of the exit is that of the coronation itself. Four acts fulfil it: The instal-
lation of the candidates and the arrival of the outgoing rulers, the speeches, the 
ceremony of the coronation and the Declaration of Rights. In the afternoon under 
the excitement of the hero, the drum, active at dawn, begins the ceremony. In the 
large place, chairs, whose transport can be an obligatory service of the subordinate 
age class, are prepared, rich and royal, by the families. Adorned with their most 
splendid loincloths, lavishly covered with gold, the candidates come as kings of the 
Akan model, surrounded by singing artists, Kokoba,20 praising friends and relatives. 
At the entrance to the central street, the district greets them and leads them to the 
main square, where they settle down, under the repeated salute of the drum, while 
their courtiers of the day reward the drummers with a rain of silver coins. Following 
the same procedure, the whole village accompanies the arrival of the rulers at the end 
of the year. The protocol that opens up any great political assembly takes place with 
solemnity, first the protocol that opens up any great political assembly takes place. At 
the sound of the drum, the autobiographical speeches, where each candidate praises 
his lineage are heard. According to the odjukru, it’s Nɛɲ-idj or the art of boasting.
Three rites make the liturgy of the coronation during the liturgy of the corona-
tion. The first rite is the perception of rights. Each candidate carries out the ultimate 
right in drink and money, the amount of which varies from one place to another. 
The second rite is religious invocation. Taking to witness God (Fonjamba) and the 
Earth (wus), the dean of the age of outgoing rulers passes power as his class has 
received, entrusts the country to the cadets and demands for their longevity and 
wisdom “that they are masters of power and that they assume it”, but not that the 
power is their master and assumes them (Ɛb-kidrɛl). He seeks for the earth tender-
ness and prosperity; for women, fertility and virtue; and for the village, peace and 
wealth. The strained drink, first to the sky, flows on the nourishing Earth. The third 
19 Military parade.
20 The Griot.
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and final rite is the coronation (fƐfritm). In large communities, a large age class can 
receive a collective sacrament in the person of its oldest age. But usually the corona-
tion is individual. The officiant takes a pinch of kaolin in the personal container of 
each candidate. With the right finger, he punctuates the forehead of the recipient, 
between the two eyebrows arches, the place of the moral conscience. Then with a 
second pinch of kaolin, he paints the candidate’s right wrist in the direction of the 
forearm towards the hand.
Finally, he raises with both hands the arms of the consecrated who, docile, rises 
consecrated who, gets up full length, docile, before sitting down. At Usr-B, the 
insignias of power are then handed to them: a machete (Lab), symbol of work and 
war; a cane (kpamâ), symbol of the supreme authority; and finally a tiara of twigs 
(Arakp), symbol of justice and peace. This day in Aklodj-A the recipients offer salt, 
symbol of communion and union, to all the women of the village. The accession of 
an age class to power, in relation to the retirement of the former governing promo-
tion and the rise of a young promotion, leads to changes in the political apparatus 
and the acquisition of new statutes. That is why the elders at the end of the inves-
titure or later formally restate the Charter of Rights and Duties of the age classes. 
Holders of power, the Ɛbebu, assume the effective direction of political and religious 
functions. They invoke the gods and ancestors in the ordinary ceremonies, which 
must guarantee the prosperity, the fertility, the peace and the independence of the 
country. After each coronation, a collective hunt is carried out in their honour. The 
Ɛbebu has the right that any speech be suspended upon their arrival and taken over 
once they are seated. Alone, they are entitled to a chair in assembly. On the death of 
a Ɛbebu (father of the village), the inhabitants, during a great parade (Jaj), sack the 
goods (cultures and animals) that his blessing has made prosper on Earth. Finally, 
because they embody the village (baηn) and are unproductive, they spend their time 
keeping it. The rulers in exercise respond to the significant salvation of Bahn Kwa or 
salvation village [28].
The term ɛb-eb comes from the word ɛb (village, city) and from the verb eb 
(caring, caring for), which literally means accepting the society. It is an action 
of gratitude to the city which saw the birth of the individual and which gave him 
everything. Clearly, it is the management of power. In the modern society in the 
democratic mimicry, the question of power rhymes with competition. Old and 
young are embarking on the race to the supreme judiciary. As we have already men-
tioned, it is largely enamelled by serious incidents (casualties, deaths, destruction 
of public buildings). The parties involved in the presidential election, who became 
enemies rather than opponents, fought fiercely for power. The policy perceived as 
the art of governing has evolved in the battlefield. The structures responsible for 
organizing the elections are biased and accused of jamming of ballot boxes and of 
the rigging of results. This situation of discomfort destroys the social cohesion.
The Lodjukru makes another reading of the transmission of power. Two age 
classes are involved in the political system. The first one holds the power. The second 
class (cadet) is the one who receives the insignia of power. It is after 8 years of man-
agement of the city that the age class at the end of the term, holder of the authority, 
gives power to the class that succeeds him during the ceremony of the Ɛb-eb. No 
election is organized for this purpose. It is true that written texts relating to the 
transmission of power do not exist in Odjukru countries, like the traditional African 
societies. However, they are recorded in drums (Brem) and collective memories. 
As a result, young people to the old, each social category is educated and trained on 
the issue of governance. The transmission is therefore descending (elder to cadets) 
and is mainly done through the age classes. Unlike modern democracy, power is 
transmitted without arguments. The age group at the end of the term is aware that 
it no longer has the political authority. As a result, she is required to return power to 
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the class that succeeds her, without bloodshed. The passing is in a festive, cordial, 
fraternal atmosphere, because the main objective to be achieved is the prosperity and 
stability of the city. In Odjukru countries, power does not fight; it is transmitted in a 
peaceful way. Coups and attempts at usurpation are prohibited, because the popula-
tions, all categories combined, have a democratic culture. Age classes know that they 
will necessarily be in power. Therefore, the struggle for power appears as a nonsense, 
a haste or even a social disorder. It disintegrates the society. Through this attitude, 
the society teaches the individual certain values, including respect for the funda-
mental texts (the Constitution), patience, self-giving and values trampled upon in 
the modern African democracies.
Like the great democracies, there is a separation of power. He′s a legal guarantor. 
The odjukru knows, like Montesquieu [12], that the spirit Odjukru knows that the 
spirit of inequality leads democracy to the aristocracy or to the government of one and 
the spirit of extreme equality leads to the despotism of one, as the despotism of only one 
ends with conquest. To avoid confusion of powers and choose representatives of the 
age class, various virtues including good morality, self-giving and dual vision are 
required by the sages, holders of gérontocratique power. Thus, the milͻwl21 provides 
the executive, and the mbwa22 represents the legislature, when the Aɲâ23 exercises the 
role of the judiciary. The distribution of responsibilities aims to prevent the promoted 
actors from becoming corrupt by implementing laws that are favourable to them. 
Of course, people are chosen to act on behalf of the age class. However, no decision 
is made without the consent of the members of the group. Clearly, power manage-
ment is collegial. The cyclical administration of power can inspire modern societies 
facing a democratic deficit, which is justified in the first chapter of the study. Like the 
United States, where two parties (Republicans and Democrats) occupy and animate 
the political scene, the multitude recorded in Africa can be grouped into two major 
entities, to exercise a mandate of five renewable ones, cyclically. This provision will 
prevent coups of states and prevent attempts to confiscate power.
4. Conclusion
The reflection on the democratic management of the cities shows how complex 
this reality is and remains an essential concern of today’s African societies. The 
hypothesis of the three zones (Burkina Faso, Mali, Lodjukru) studied is therefore 
not fortuitous. The observation of the facts and the analysis of the data made it 
possible to identify different socio-political crises due to a democratic deficit. Thus, 
demonstrations on the deprivation of liberty, poor living and working condi-
tions are part of the daily lives of the people. Repressions, most often bloody, are 
recorded in the countries raised. In addition to this, there are contested elections 
due to poor organizational conditions (ballot jams, result-rigging), thus causing 
poor governance and autocratic management. This situation of discomfort shows 
the inadequacy of democracy, modelled on the west, and the democratic inculture 
of the leaders. Good governance is not in exile in Africa. The example of Lodjukru, 
through the Ɛb-eb, is an illustration, because the transmission of power is peaceful. 
In short, if the countries of sub-Saharan Africa have a poor governance, circum-
vented in Odjukru countries, democracy in this region of Africa requires a profound 
analysis to adapt it to the sociocultural context of our societies.
21 It’s the President of age Group.
22 The concept designates the Herault.
23 He raises the sessions.
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